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Abstract
PRIVACY PROTECTION ON CLOUD COMPUTING
By Min Li
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015.
Director: Dr. Meng Yu,
Assoc. Professor, Department of Computer Science
Cloud is becoming the most popular computing infrastructure because it can
attract more and more traditional companies due to flexibility and cost-effectiveness.
However, privacy concern is the major issues that prevent users from deploying on
public clouds.
The root cause of privacy problem is current cloud privilege design that gives
too much power to cloud providers. Once the control virtual machine (installed by
cloud providers) is compromised, external adversaries will breach users’ privacy. Ma-
licious cloud administrators are also possible to disclose user’s privacy by abusing
the privilege of cloud providers. In this dissertation, I propose two cloud architec-
tures – MyCloud and MyCloud SEP to protect user’s privacy based on hardware
virtualization technology. I eliminate the privilege of cloud providers by moving the
control virtual machine (control VM) to the processor’s non-root mode and only keep
the privacy protection and performance crucial components in the Trust Computing
Base (TCB). In addition, the new cloud platform can provide rich functionalities
on resource management and allocation without greatly increasing the TCB size.
x
In MyCloud and MyCloud SEP, the hypervisor maintains an access control matrix
to record users’ configured policy for privacy protection. All resource accesses (e.g.
memory and disks) will be checked by the hypervisor against access control matrix.
I implement a prototype on x86 architecture and the performance evaluation results
show acceptable overheads.
Besides the attacks to control VM, many external adversaries will compromise
one guest VM or directly install a malicious guest VM, then target other legitimate
guest VMs based on the connections. Thus, collocating with vulnerable virtual ma-
chines, or ”bad neighbours” on the same physical server introduces additional security
risks. I develop a migration based scenario that quantifies the security risk of each VM
and generates virtual machine placement to minimize the security risks considering
the connections among virtual machines. According to the experiment, our approach
can improve the survivability of most VMs.
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a comprehensive technology relying on Internet, hardware
and software technology. It can offer users cheap, scalable and effective computing
services. The cloud users buy shared cloud infrastructures and pay cloud providers as
how much they use. Cloud computing allows companies focus on project and services
that differentiate their businesses rather than infrastructures management.
In terms of service models, the cloud computing services can be categorized
as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and software as a
service (Saas). The IaaS cloud providers offer physical resources like storage, memory
and network etc to cloud users. In IaaS cloud, users can scale services up and down
according their demand. Cloud users can install operating system and application
software on the cloud infrastructure. The cloud providers should manage and protect
the OS and software deployed by users. In PaaS cloud, cloud providers can offer
a computing platform including existed operating system, database, webserver etc.
The cloud users can directly run their software or applications without purchasing the
physical resources and deploying operating systems. In SaaS cloud, cloud providers
have already installed software and applications. Users should buy the access to the
“on-demand software” which simplifies the maintenance and support of cloud users
to implement their business. In this dissertation, I will focus on solving the privacy
issues on IaaS cloud model.
IaaS cloud providers will install a Hypervisor (e.g. Xen [1], KVM [2], VMware
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ESXi [3]) and Microsoft [4] to support large numbers of guest virtual machines (VMs).
The hypervisor is responsible to provide virtualization, VMs scheduling and system
initialization. Cloud providers will also deploy a privileged virtual machine (Dom 0
or Host OS) to manage and allocate the cloud resources. In current Iaas cloud, both
hypervisor and the privileged VM are running in the privileged mode because cloud
providers should protect cloud resources from external adversaries and migrate the
guest VMs in order to improve the performance of cloud resources.
Privacy concerns prevent many users especially financial institutions from de-
ploying their business in cloud computing environment. External attackers are able
to compromise one guest VM and target next guest VM connected with the compro-
mised VM. In order to protect users privacy from this attack, I propose a migration
based solution. My approach will predict the possibility of being attacked for each
guest VM then generate a new migration plan to place the most “dangerous” VM in
a dedicated physical machine. However, this approach only improves the possibility
of guest VM’s survivability in an attack rather than stop the attack from happening.
In addition, this approach cannot protect user’s privacy from inside attacks. Based
on hardware technology, I propose two scenarios on privacy protection – MyCloud
and MyCloud SEP . The cloud users only need to trust the hardware (e.g. CPU,
motherboard etc,.) and verifiable hypervisor. In summary, the contributions in my
dissertation are:
1. Propose a systematic approach to evaluate the security of VMs in cloud platform
and generate a migration plan in order to improve the survival possibility of
most guest VMs.
2. Design a new cloud architecture to protect users’ privacy from both internal
and external attacks.
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3. Greatly reduce the size of TCB of the new cloud architecture by separating the
resource management and security protection.
4. Allow cloud users participate in privacy protection in order to solve mutual
distrust between cloud providers and cloud users.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Related work is in chapter 2.
In chapter 3, we will discuss the migration based approach to increase the survivability
of VMs. In chapter 4 and chapter 5, we will present hardware based security strategy
- MyCloud and MyCloud SEP.
1.2 Motivation and Problem
The privacy issue in cloud computing is the biggest pain points for cloud users.
By 2016, the user’s concern on privacy will make cloud market lose 35 billion dol-
lars [5]. In my research most threats on users’ privacy can be categorized as external
attacks and inside attacks.
External attackers can compromise the cloud platform via vulnerabilities of the
control VM or the cloud hypervisor [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]. After taking over the privilege
of cloud providers, the adversary is able to disclose user’s privacy. MyCloud and
MyCloud SEP can fight against this kind of attack by reducing the attack surface
and moving the control VM to non-privileged mode. Another type of external attacker
will deploy a malicious guest VM or compromise a legal guest VM in cloud platform,
then try to compromise other guest VMs connected to the malicious/compromised
VM via the vulnerabilities in the applications and services of guest VMs [11]. The
migration based approach can place other legal VMs to a safe physical server before
the external adversary completes an attack.
Inside attackers refer to the malicious cloud administrators who may misuse the
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privilege of cloud providers and disclose users’ privacy. Both MyCloud and MyCloud
SEP can eliminate the privilege of cloud administrators. When cloud providers need
to access users’ privacy, they should grant the agreement of the owners of the privacy.
Cloud users can manage their privacy throughout the interface provided by cloud
hypervisor. Cloud hypervisor is responsible to intercept and check the permission of
all resource access. The cloud providers in new architecture can only manage and
allocate the cloud resource.
In general, there are many business model in cloud. For example, platform as
a service (PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS). However, my work only focus on
infrastructure as a service (IaaS). In IaaS cloud, users will buy the hardware resources
and deploy the service by themselves. Cloud providers only guarantee the security
and availability of cloud resources. Therefore, version control of users’ data is out
of scope of this work. In this work, our contribution is to provide the protection
mechanism rather than design protection policy for guest VMs. Our goal is to allow
cloud users manage privacy by themselves.
1.3 Intel Virtualization Technology
1.3.1 CPU Virtualization – Vt-x
Intel Vt-x technology (aka. VMX ) can support processor virtualization for cloud
design. The Vt-x technology can divide all operations in cloud as VMX non-root op-
eration and VMX root operation. When the physical server is booted, the processors
will stay in the VMX root mode. Cloud hypervisor can enable the VMX technology
then jump to the non-root mode by VMLAUNCH. In MyCloud and MyCloud SEP,
only the cloud hypervisor can execute root operations. All VMs including the control
VM are running in the non-root mode. If any VMs execute one privileged operation
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in non-root mode, A transition (VMEXIT) between VMX root mode and VMX non-
root mode will happen. After the cloud hypervisor handles the VMEXIT transition,
it can execute VMRESUME to reload the guest VM and return back to the VMX
non-root mode.
Except the VMX operations (e.g. VMLAUNCH, VMPTRLD etc), other privi-
leged CPU instructions are executed as they are in the bare-metal machine. The cloud
hypervisor should initialize the whole system, manage physical memory and handle
all interrupts, exceptions and VMEXITs in root mode. In order to provide a virtu-
alized machine status and control the VMX transitions, Vt-x technology proposes a
data structure called virtual-machine control structure (VMCS).
VMCS is composed by a 4KB physical page. The address of VMCS is referred
to VMCS pointer. When the hypervisor tries to launch a guest VM, it should send
VMCS pointer to a physical core. In Intel Vt-x technology, each physical core can
be assigned only one active VMCS. The hypervisor should take responsibility to
schedule the physical cores to execute different VMCS. The hypervisor can configure
the VMCS through VMREAD, VMWRITE and VMCLEAR instructions. In VMCS
the hypervisor can set up the initial register value for guest VM (e.g. CR0, CR3 etc,.)
Also, the VMCS can indicate which privileged instruction of guest VM will cause the
VMEXIT. For example, the hypervisor can claim any MOV CR instructions should
be trapped in VMCS. When guest VM tries to modify the value of CR registers by
MOV instructions, a VMEXIT will cause a transition from none-root mode to root
mode. The hypervisor can also trap modifying other system register (e.g. MSR,
GDTR, LDTR, IDTR etc,). Similarly, the hypervisor can also trap the I/O port
read/write, interrupt and exception in configuring the VMCS. The basic layout of
VMCS is as follows.
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1. Guest-state area: The initial system state will be loaded into guest VM after
VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME
2. Host-state area: The machine state when VMEXIT happens
3. VM-execution control field: The restriction of operations in guest VM
4. VM-exit control field: Control VM exit
5. VM-entry control field: Control VM entry
6. VM-exit information field: Restore the information which can describe the
cause of VMEXIT.
Usually, the hypervisor uses VM-execution control field, VM-exit control field and
VM-entry control field to control the instruction in guest VMs.
Figure 1 shows an overview of cloud architecture made by VMX technology.
There are two guest VMs running in the non-root mode. Cloud hypervisor creates
two different VMCS for each guest VM. In the opinion of cloud users, guest VMs are
assigned two physical cores. The cloud hypervisor should initialize and launch the
guest VM by VMLAUNCH and handle the VMEXIT in guest VMs.
We can also improve the cloud security by the Vt-x technology, because the
Vt-x build a new privileged architecutre in cloud. The hypervisor could program
the VMCS and CPU will return to the hypervisor when VMs execute privileged
instructions. Therefore, the malicious VM is not able to compromise the hypervisor
or other VMs if the hypervisor is capable to detect the malicious activities. The cloud
developers can execute all privileges softwares, malware detection engine in the root
mode. Other VMs including the privileged VM are moved to the non-root mode.
Then each privileged instructions will be trapped by the CPU and analyzed by the
6
CPU
Cloud Hypervisor
Guest VM Guest VM
VMEXIT 
  HandlerVMCS Init
Core #1 Core #2 Core #3 Core #4
VMCS VMCS VMCS VMCS
Ring 0
Ring 3
Non Root
Root
App App
Kernel Kernel
VMEXIT
VMLAUNCH VMRESUME
Fig. 1.: Intel VMX Overview [12]
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hypervisor. Vt-x is a CPU feature, so we can assume the Vt-x can always trap the
instructions as we program.
1.3.2 Memory Virtualization – EPT
The architecture of VMX operation supports the extended page-table mechanism
(EPT) in order to implement memory virtualization and address translation. When
EPT is in use, the addresses which would normally be translated as physical address
are instead treated as guest physical address (GPA). The memory management unit
(MMU) will further translate the guest physical address to host physical address
(HPA) in EPT. In non-root mode, the operating system is responsible to translate
the guest virtual address (GVA) to guest physical address (GPA).
In guest VM, memory access using guest physical address may cause VM exit
due to EPT misconfiguration and EPT violations. An EPT misconfiguration will
occur if any of the following cases is identified while MMU translates a guest physical
address.
1. The EPT page is either write-only or write/execute only.
2. The EPT page is execute only but the processor does not support this capability.
3. The EPT page is present but the reserved bit is set.
An EPT violation will occur when there is no EPT misconfiguration but the EPT
page disallows an access using the guest physical address due to the following reasons.
1. The EPT page is not present.
2. The access is data read but the EPT page does not allow read operation.
3. The access is data write but the EPT page does not allow write operation.
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Non-Root
Root
MMU
VMCS.EPTP
Guest Physical 
      Address
Extended Page Table (EPT)
Guest CR3
Guest Virtual
     Address
Host Physical Address
EPT Violation
PML4 PDPTE PDE PTE
Fig. 2.: Memory Translation in EPT
4. The access is an instruction fetch but the EPT page does not allow execute
operation.
As shown in Figure 2, the memory access made by guest VM will cause an EPT
violation. MyCloud/MyCloud SEP hypervisor can receive the VMEXIT and check
the permission to access the physical address. In MyCloud and MyCloud SEP, the
cloud hypervisor will create the 4-step EPT table in order to trap 4-step address
translation in guest VM. The hypervisor should claim the start address of EPT in
VMCS.EPTP and configure the CR3 register for guest VM. The guest VM will trans-
late a GVA to GHA using the page table pointed by CR3 register. In each step of
address translation, EPT violation will happen because the hypervisor has marked
each physical page as read-only. In the VMEXIT handler, the hypervisor can read
the GPA and HPA from VMCS and check if this guest VM can access the intercepted
memory space.
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With the help of EPT technology, MyCloud and MyCloud SEP can provide
memory isolation between VMs. Any memory access will be checked by the cloud
hypervisor. Therefore, malicious memory access made by cloud administrators can
be prohibited by cloud hypervisor.
With EPT memory virtualization, cloud hypervisor can create 2 or more views
of the same machine memory region with different permission. In that case, the
code/data of different VMs are isolated. The EPT technology can provide page-
granular protections. The hypervisor can build the EPT page table for each VM.
When the page table in guest VM try to retrieve the real memory address, CPU will
firstly check the EPT table. If a page missing or page fault happens, the CPU will
call the hypervisor to handle it. EPT is also a hardware feature and the EPT page
table is controlled by the hypervisor. Therefore, the code and data in each guest
VM is protected and isolated. If there is a malicious access to guser’s memory, the
hypervisor will receive the violation from CPU. If the hypervisor is capable to detect
this malisiouc access, the attack can be prohibited.
1.3.3 Device Memory Isolation – Vt-d
In order to assign the physical device to guest VM and separate the memory
between device and guest VM, MyCloud and MyCloud SEP enable Intel Virtual-
ization Technology for Directed I/O (Vt-d). The general functionality of Vt-d is to
isolate and restrict device accesses to the resources belong to guest VMs. Intel Vt for
directed I/O technology can provide the hypervisor with the following capabilities:
1.3.3.1 DMA Remapping
DMA remapping can provide a hardware support for isolation between device
memory and VM memory. Also, DMA remapping can assign a device to a specific
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Fig. 3.: Assign A Device to Guest VM
VM through a distinct set of I/O page tables. The DMA remapping hardware can
intercept device memory access and determine whether the access can be permitted.
The cloud hypervisor can isolate the device DMA access to memory by programming
the I/O page table. The DMA remapping can be programmed independently for each
device. Similar to the guest physical address (GPA) DMA remapping will treat the
address in a DMA request as DMA-virtual address (DVA). DMA remapping will be
responsible to transform the DVA to its corresponding host physical address (HPA).
Figure 3 explains how to map a device to a specific memory space. The hypervisor
can find the address of Root-entry Table in register Root-entry table address register.
After the DMA remapping hardware intercepts the DMA request, it can acquire the
bus number from DMA transaction’s source-id field. The bus number will be used to
index into the root-entry structure. The Context-entry maps a specific I/O device on
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a bus to the assigned guest VM. The context-entry will store the address of a multi-
level page table in ASR field. After the address translating in multi-level page table,
device virtual address will be transformed into host physical address. The process of
memory translation is the same as general memory management in operating system.
Due to the DMA remapping, the memory space where a device can access will be
restricted into a specific region.
1.3.3.2 Interrupt Remapping
The interrupt remapping architecture allows the cloud hypervisor to control the
external interrupt generated by devices. The interrupt remapping hardware uses an
interrupt remapping table specified through the Interrupt Remapping Table Address
register. When the hardware traps the interrupt, the interrupt index can be used to
search appropriate IRTE in interrupt remapping table. By programming the interrupt
remapping table, the hardware will send the interrupt to the corresponding guest VM.
However, the general interrupt cannot be remapped. The cloud hypervisor needs to
program the Redirection Table Entries (RTE) in I/O APIC and MSI address and
data register to support remappable MSI and PCI interrupt.
This technology is designed to isolate the device and VMs. Since device memory
is accessed by DMA, the CPU is not able to intercept it. The hypervisor should
program the DMA remapping table in order to make sure the device will not access
VM’s memory.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Many existing migration approaches have been used to improve the performance of
cloud platform and reduce the resource consumption. For example, [13] and [14]
propose a virtual machine placement strategy in order to optimize the poper cost. Our
proposed work is the first effort to deploy the placement to enhance cloud security.
In term of the hardware-based approach to protect users privacy, the most similar
work to ours is Self-Service Cloud computing (SSC) [15]. SSC isolates the host OS
into small components and SSC allows client VMs to execute some management of
privileges, which used to be provided in administrative domain such as to access
VM’s memory, execute CPUID instruction, etc,. Similarly, NoHype [16] and [17]
assign physical resources to VMs and dynamically eliminates VMM layer in order to
narrow the hypervisor attack surface. Recent work also investigates the uses of nested
virtualization to disaggregate some host VMM components to the guest VMM like
CloudVisor [18]
2.1 Migration Based Privacy Protection Approach
An effective Virtual Machine placement strategy can greatly improve the perfor-
mance of cloud platform. For example, the VMs with shared memory pages can be
optimized by placing them in the same physical servers [19]. Those VMs can deliver
data through shared memory instead of network.
To improve the efficiency of cloud, Many work dynamically clusters VMs and
distributes resources to different clusters [14, 20, 21]. [13] developed a generic algo-
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rithm to create a placement plan to reduce Estimated Total Execution Time (ETET).
Work [22] provided a scheduling model to optimize virtual cluster placement through
cloud offers. The cloud prices and user demand have been considered in the model.
The experimental results on the real data show that dynamic placement plan can
bring more benefits on reducing users’ costs than the fixed one.
Our previous work [23] proposed to periodically migrating VMs based on game
theory, making it much harder for adversaries to locate the target VMs in terms
of survivability measurement. However, our previous work did not discuss how to
evaluate the security of a cloud placement and how to generate a placement plan to
improve the cloud security.
Unfortunately, none of the above work considered the privacy security issue. I
will propose an innovative and effective migration based approach to protect user’s
privacy.
2.2 Hypervisor Based Privacy Protection Approach
Since the hypervisor is running with the highest privilege in cloud, previous work
tried to protect user’s privacy by utilizing the privilege of hypervisor. MAVMM [24]
and Trustvisor [25] are light-weight hypervisors that can intercept and record the
activities of guest VMs. The malware analysis tools running with MAVMM hypervisor
can detect the adversary by analyzing those information.
NOVA [26] is a micro-kernel based hypervisor in order to improve the security of
cloud platform by reducing the size of Trust Computing Base (TCB) [27]. However,
NOVA can not monitor the malicious activities of the privileged VM and external
device drivers. NOVA should rely on the host operating system to provide the virtu-
alized environment for guest VMs, but masses of vulnerabilities in host OS will allow
the adversary compromise the hypervisor easily.
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XMHF [28] and Terra [29] is a tiny hypervisor which can supports other hyper-
visor development and protection. XMHF provide an extendable hypervisor design
platform which also supports modular developments of hypervisor. Also XMHF de-
ploy model checking to verify the hypervisor code. However, the design goal of xmhf
is not to protect users privacy from inside and external attack.
Many researchers have focus on disaggregating the functionality of privileged
VM into smaller components [30] [15] [31]. Bitvisor is established to reduce the
attack surface of privileged VM (Dom0). Bitvisor can remove the untrusted device
drivers to other unprivileged VMs. But the hypervisor still takes charge of many
complicated management work like resource assignment, device virtualization etc,.
Similar to Bitvisor, Self-service cloud (SSC) split Dom 0 into system-wide domain and
user administrative domains, service domains and mutually trusted service domains
. However those domains are still running in the privileged mode, thus the TCB
size is not reduced. DeHype is also designed to separate KVM into deprivileged
section and privileged section. However it relies on pinned memory blocks in linux
kernel and mapping them to user space. The untrusted host OS is possible to fake
the memory mapping. Xen-Disaggregation [32] can disaggregate the management
virtual machine (Dom0) by moving the domain builder, the privileged component
into a trusted compartment. However these compartments are still running in the
privileged mode.
Nested virtualization technology [33] is introduced by Turtle [34] and Xen-blanket [35]
which divide the hypervisor as host hypervisor and guest hypervisor in order to allow
cloud users execute configured work in guest hypervisor. Many researchers focus on
reducing the attack surface by separating the components of hypervisor. Our pre-
visour work Splitvisor [36] [37] can divide the legacy hypervisor into the privileged
section and unprivileged section. Only privileged section can be launched in the root
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mode and responsible for guest VMs management. The unprivileged section will be
in charge of presenting virtualized environment. Besides, Cloudvisor [18] also classify
the hypervisor as host hypervisor and guest hypervisor. The host hypervisor exe-
cutes privileged instruction like VMEXIT handler, while the guest hypervisor will
provide rich functionalities like VMs management. However, CloudVisor is launched
on an untrusted platform, but it can not provide an authenticated boot process for
late launch. Furthermore, the host operating system is running in the same CPU
privilege level as hypervisor. The adversary is highly possible to compromise the
hypervisor via untrusted host OS. Neither Splitvisor nor Cloudvisor can detect the
malicious activity of external device and privileged VM. Moreover, to deploy nested
virtualization on x86 hardware imposes tremendous performance penalties which in-
creases exponentially with nesting depth [33].
HyperLock [38] build an isolated memory space and develop Hyperlock controller
to restrict the malicious access to privileged resource. However this approach only
focuses on protecting privacy on memory and require the support of host OS.
Some previous work measures the hypervisor integrity on the basis of System
Management Mode (SMM) [39] hardware feature. For example, Hypersentry [40]
and HyperCheck [41] can launch SMI single to CPU and switch to SMM mode. The
CPU will store the current machine status in SMRAM, then the network card will
deliver the register values and memory to remote verification machine. SICE [42] and
SecureSwitch [43] utilize x86 SMM to isolate the TCB. The security of isolated envi-
ronment is guaranteed by the TCB including hardware, BIOS and SMM program of
 300 LOCs. However, SICE only supports one VM so it will not be compatible with
any cloud platform. Flicker [44] is also considered a privacy protection solution based
on CPU features [45] [46]. Unfortunately, it only offers application level protection
and is not a general solution for VMs in cloud.
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In order to eliminate the security threat from hypervisor and privileged VMs,
NoHype [16] [47] removes the virtualization layer. However, each guest VM must be
assigned dedicated physical CPU core and nested page table. This design restricts
the number of VMs on cloud platform.
Besides privacy protection in cloud computing, many research efforts focus on
protecting the privacy of user application against untrusted operating system using a
VMM-based approach [48, 49, 50, 37, 51]. The goal of our work is different from that
of above research. We aim to protect privacy of guest VMs (including the hosted user
applications) against the untrusted cloud administrators, rather than protecting the
user applications’ privacy against the untrusted OS.
MyCloud and MyCloudSEP reduce the attack surface of privileged VMs by re-
moving the Dom0 or hostOS from privileged mode to non-privileged mode. We also
move the resource management, device driver and virtualized device from the hy-
pervisor to a resource allocator in order to reduce the possibility of hypervisor to
be compromised. In MyCloud and MyCloud SEP, we design user-configured access
control scenario so that the mutually distrust can solved. The hypervisor will be re-
sponsible for monitoring the malicious resource access of cloud provider and external
device. [52]
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CHAPTER 3
MIGRATION BASED PRIVACY PROTECTION - VM PLACEMENT
3.1 Introduction
In current public cloud, VMs are installed in the same physical machines. Some
of VMs working in the same subnet or physical server may collaborate in order to com-
plete a service. Collaborating with vulnerable VMs or running in the physical server
with malicious VMs will increase the security risk. The connections between VMs via
network or shared physical resources will introduce attacks. The external adversary
can compromise a vulnerable VM, then find next target via network connection. Also
he can deploy a malicious VM and attack other VMs in the same physical server. In
order to improve the security of the entire cloud, we design a VM placement strategy
which will migrate the legitimate VMs to a secure physical servers or network.
We have already found many attacks against vulnerabilities in cloud hypervisor
and the control VM. For example, some adversaries exploit the vulnerabilities of cloud
hypervisor (e.g. CVE-2007-4993,2007). Once they compromise the hypervisor (e.g.
KVM and Xen), the users’ VMs will be taken over. Some other attackers will place
a malicious VM in the public cloud and compromise the VMs running in the same
physical server by side channel attack [11]. Additionally, the adversary can find the
next target by analyzing the network connections of compromised VMs.
In order to protect users privacy in public cloud, I propose a migration-based
approach which generates the VM placements strategy based on security evaluation of
each VM. To evaluate the security of each VM, I deploy District Time Markov Chain
(DTMC) and predict the possibility of each VM being compromised. Then a place-
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ment strategy will be produced based on security evaluation. After VMs migration,
users’ VMs will survive before the attack completes. Meanwhile, my approach also
considers the performance overhead because the closer connected VMs are placed,
the better performance the cloud platform will acquire.
To the best of our knowledge, this approach is the first effort to develop the
following mechanisms and techniques to enhance cloud security through changing
cloud placement. The contribution of my migration-based placement strategy is as
below:
1. I present a systematic approach to predict the possibility of VM on each attack
step, then move away the VMs before attack succeeds.
2. I propose an algorithm to generate a secure placement plan which also takes
performance cost into consideration.
3. The evaluation results in a real public cloud show my approach can greatly
improve the security of entire cloud platform.
3.2 Assumption and Design Goals
An example of cloud placement is shown in Figure 4a. Each VMs on every
node (physical server) may execute different services and some of VMs are dependent
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on others. Node is a physical machine where runs a few of VMs with the limit of
hardware resources. The cloud provider is the owner of a public cloud and sell the
cloud resources to cloud users. The cloud provider also takes charges of managing the
cloud resources and protecting users privacy. Therefore, cloud provider will design
and deploy VMs placement strategy in a public cloud.
Generally, the adversaries should take several steps to compromise a VM. As
shown in Figure 4b. The adversary starts from compromising one VM on a new server
(S0). After hypervisor is compromised (S1), the adversary will collect dependency
information of compromised VMs (S2). Finally, new target server will be selected
(S3).
We make the following assumptions on cloud adversaries who want to compromise
the VMs and users privacy.
1. The cloud adversaries can detect the vulnerabilities of both cloud platform and
virtual machines.
2. The cloud adversaries will follow the attack transition graph (Figure 4b) to
compromise a VM step by step.
3. The cloud adversaries always choose the easiest target in term of the vulnera-
bilities.
4. The attacker has no global view of the cloud at the beginning of the attacks.
However, the attacker may acquire more knowledge after compromising more
nodes in the cloud.
If the cloud provider can migrate VMs to a safe node before the node is compro-
mised, migrated VMs will survive this attack. We set up the following goals when
design the placement algorithm.
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1. Reduce the number of compromised VMs.
2. Increase the survivability of services.
3. The placement algorithm is also compatible with performance requirements.
In order to verify the improvement of survivability after migration, we define the
survivability of a service in Theorem 1. Then we need to evaluate the survivability
of a node as shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 1 (Survivability of a Service). Given a service Si (VM chain) including
some related Si = fVMa;VMb; :::;VMng and node set N = fN1;N2; :::;Nmg, If the
survivability in specific attack step for the Nodes which hold the VM belong to Si is
fPN1;PN2; :::;PNmg, Then survivability (PS) for service Si is below:
PSi =
m
Õ
j=1
PN j: (3.1)
Theorem 2 (Survivability of a Node). Given a node N and a set of VMs= fVMa;VMb; :::VMmg
which locate at node N, and the compromised probability for these VMs are fPa;Pb; :::;Pmg,
the survivability (PN) for Node N is below:
PNN =
m
Õ
j=1
(1 Pj) (3.2)
3.3 Approach Overview
The structure of migration-based approach is shown in Figure 4. In order to
accomplish the design goal, my approach includes three components: security evalu-
ation, strategy generation, and performance evaluation. First of all, the dependency
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exploration mechanism detects the service dependencies among VMs through net-
work connections.We evaluate each VM’s security level according to the vulnerabili-
ties found in VM’s operating system. Afterwards, we utilize Discrete Time Markov
Chain Analysis (DTMC) to predict the possibility of successful attacks in each at-
tack step. Finally, we design an algorithm to create the placement plan which takes
security and performance into consideration.
3.3.1 Security Evaluation
In order to quantify the vulnerability, we firstly scan the guest VMs and detect
the vulnerabilities matched in National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [53]. After-
wards, Discrete Time Markov Chain Analysis (DTMC) will predict the possibility of
an successful attacks in each step.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [54] provides a framework to scan
the guest VM and score security of guest VMs based on vulnerabilities. There are
three metrics group in CVSS system: base, temporal, and environment. Each of them
can represents different characters of vulnerabilities.
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3.3.2 Markov Chain Analysis
In order to represent the attack path and possibility of successful attack in each
step, we will use attack dependency graph (ADG) as shown in Figure 5. The proce-
dure of DTMC prediction is explained as follows:
1. For n nodes in ADG graph, assume the initial probability distribution on each
node is p(0) = (1;0;0; : : : ;0| {z }
n 1
). The initial p(0) is determined by attacker’s first
choice.
2. In attack step 1, the possibility distribution of attacker can compromise con-
nected VM’s is p(1) = p(0)P1
3. After kth step attack, the possibility distribution will become p(n) = p(0)Pn
where P is the state-transition probability matrix of DTMC and P= P P   P| {z }
n
.
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For example, Figure 5 is used as an example to explain how DTMC predict the
attack possibility in each step. I assume that the first compromised VM should be
VM2, so p(0) = f0 1 0 0 0 0 0g. Hence we may obtain the attack possibility from
above assumption. For example, the edge from VM3 to VM7 is 0.9, which indicates
that after VM3 is compromised, VM7 will have 90% chance to be taken over by the
attacker. The corresponding state-transition probability matrix P is as follows.
P=
0BBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0:2 0 0:8 0 0
0 0:1 0 0 0 0 0:9
0:5 0 0 0 0:5 0 0
0 0:3 0 0:7 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1CCCA (3.3)
For Step 1, we get the possibility of being compromised for each VM is p(1) =
f0 0 0:2 0 0:8 0 0g. Based on the result, VM5 is the most dangerous VM, then we
remove the edges which point to VM5 because the attacker will not compromise VM5
again in the following attack path. Hence, the result of matrix P after step one should
be as follows and the DAG should be:
P=
0BBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0:1 0 0 0 0 0:9
0:5 0 0 0 0:5 0 0
0 0:3 0 0:7 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1CCCA (3.4)
Markov Chain analysis will end if the step reach the longest path in an ADG. Hence,
The probability distribution for the initial state and the first 6 steps are as follows.
0BB@
p(0)
p(1)
p(2)
p(3)
p(4)
p(5)
1CCA=
0BBB@
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0:2 0 0 0:8 0
0 0:26 0 0:56 0 0 0:18
0:56 0 0:26 0 0 0:18 0
0 0:026 0 0 0 0 0:414
0 0 0:026 0 0 0:414 0
1CCCA (3.5)
where p(k);0 k  5 is the probability distribution in step k. In the above example,
according to p(4), in the 4th step, the probability that VM2 is compromised will be
2:6% and the probability that VM7 is compromised will be 41:4%.
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3.3.3 Placement Generation
Based on the above discussion, we have acquired the possibility of being attacked
for each VM. Next, we will design a placement strategy to reallocate guest VMs
before the attack succeeds. The principle of new strategy is isolating the VMs with
high security risks from VMs with low security. In order to reduce the performance
overhead, connected VMs with similar security risk will be assigned in the same node.
When design the placement algorithm, we assume the node will have enough resources
capacity (e.g. CPU, memory and disks etc.) to hold all guest VMs. In each attack
step, DTMC and CVSS will predict the attack possibility for each VM. The algorithm
will sort the possibility and find the most “dangerous” VM which is most likely to be
compromised. The algorithm will assign the most dangerous VM to a dedicated node
and allocate other VMs to different node. Therefore, even if the most dangerous VM
is compromised, other VM will not be exploited by the attacker.
Algorithm 1 Placement Strategy Generation Algorithm
Require:
 Virtual machine set V = fV1;V2; :::Vng
 Dependent VMs set for each VM set DependentVMs,
where DependentVMi is the set which represents the dependent VMs for VMi: (i  n)
 The Physical machine (Node) set N = fN1;N2; :::Nkg
 The compromised possibility for each VM is Pi( i  n)
Ensure: Placement Strategy
1: Sort VMs in ascending order of attack possibility Sort(V = fV1;V2; :::Vng)
2: dangerousVM = findMostDangerous() will find the most dangerous VM index by comparing compromised
possibility of VMs in set V
3: dangerousNode = findRandomNode() will find a random node to store the dangerous VM.
4: Map(dangerousVM, dangerousNode) will assign dangerousVM to dangerousNode
5: while !V .empty() do
6: node = findRandomNode() will return a new node
7: newVM = V .pop() find a safe VM
8: Map(NewVM, node) assign new VM to safe node
9: Map(DependentNewVM, node) assign the connected VMs into same node.
10: update V
11: end while
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Hardware
CPU: Intel Xeon x5650 2.66GHz  2
RAM: 8GB DDR3 1333MHz 
Ethernet: Broadcom NetXtreme II BCM570
Table 1.: Platform Specifications of DTMC Calculation.
3.4 Evaluation
3.4.1 Case Study
Thanks to [ANONYMIZED COMPANY NAME] offering us a real cloud data
set. The ADG and VMs relations are based on this data set. The data set and our
placement conditions are explained as follows.
 81 VMs and 10 physical nodes.
 The capacity for 10 nodes are 20, 15, 10, 10, 10, 5, 5, 5, 5, and 5.
 81 services are running on these VMs.
3.4.1.1 Migration Overhead
When migrating a VM, the VM is usually shut off first, hence, migration time is
one of the most significant factor we should consider in order to improve the system
performance. In order to test the overhead on VMs migration, we design an evaluation
on the platform specified as Table 1.
Figure 6 presents a migration delay of Web server on our platform.
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3.4.1.2 Security Improvement
According to our experimental results shown in Figure 7, the 91.3% services
obtained improved survivability. The maximum survivability enhancement is 74.28%
and the average improvement of survivability possibility is 27.15%.
In our experiment, we can find there are 20 VMs will be compromised at attack
step 1 in random placement plan. However, in our new placement plan, the number
of compromised VMs is only 4. Moreover, according to our statistics, the average
compromised VM number is 4 in our plan, But in random placement, this average
number of compromised VMs is 11.
3.5 Summary
Cloud computing is quickly becoming more and more important in computing
infrastructures. In the migration-based privacy protection approach, we demonstrated
that the placement of VMs can make huge difference in terms of security levels.
Based on survivability evaluation of VMs and DTMC analysis, we developed an
algorithm to generate a safe placement plan that moves the guest VMs before attack
succeeds. The experimental results show that our algorithm can significantly improve
the survivability of VMs in the cloud and reduce the number of compromised VMs
in case of attacks. The overheads of our proposed approach are also practical.
In many cases, same vulnerabilities can run on different VMs which will cause
adversary to compromise these different VMs simultaneously. However, our scenario
doesn’t take this problem into account. Also, my approach does not help cloud
providers decide how often to migrate the guest VMs. According to the performance
evaluation part, if the cloud providers migrate new VMs too frequently, the VMs will
response slowly. On the contrary, if the cloud providers keep a migration plan for
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long time, the attackers will have enough time to complete the attack.
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CHAPTER 4
USER CONFIGURED CLOUD PLATFORM WITH MYCLOUD
4.1 Introduction
Privacy security is still the major concern for cloud users. The migration based
protection approach cannot fundamentally solve the privacy issues because the cloud
provider is still in charge of VMs migration. The cause of privacy issues is that
current cloud design may enable the adversary abuse the privilege of cloud provider
to disclose users’ privacy. Once the cloud provider is compromised or the malicious
cloud administrator acquire the management of cloud provider, users’ privacy will be
breached. In addition, in current cloud platform, only cloud provider takes charge of
cloud management. Cloud users do not realize whether their private information is
securely protected, since they are not engaged in data management. In this project,
I propose a new scenario - MyCloud [55] which replies on hardware virtualization
technology and eliminates the privilege of cloud provider. In MyCloud, only hypervi-
sor is executed in CPU root mode and responsible for protecting users’ privacy from
malicious inspection. The cloud users can design the policy of privacy protection and
deploy user-configured privacy through HyperCall.
In current cloud platform like KVM [2], Xen [1] and VMware [3] etc, cloud
provider is endowed with the privilege to manage the whole cloud resources including
users’ data. Cloud providers allocate specific resources to guest VMs, scan virus on
guest VMs and migrate guest VMs in order to improve the performance of cloud
platform. Cloud users cannot manage the private data stored in current cloud plat-
form. For example, the users of Amazon EC2 [56] cannot inspect their owned memory
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because cloud providers will not allow such privileged operations.
Mutual distrust between cloud users and the cloud providers is another challenge
on privacy protection in cloud computing. On one hand, the cloud providers are
motivated to monitor client virtual machines in order to make sure that users will
not use cloud resources to launch illegal services. For example, a lot of spam emails
are reported to sent from IP addresses belong Amazon EC2 [57]. On the other hand,
user’s concerns about privilege misuse by the cloud providers are greatly increasing
because a malicious administrator can easily disclose their private data [58] .
According to my understanding, current cloud privilege design is the root cause
of privacy issues in cloud computing. Current trust computing base (TCB) of cloud
platform includes a privileged control VM (Dom 0 or host VM) and cloud hyper-
visor. Usually, this control VM is a complete commercial operating system and
executes multiple third-party device drivers. Therefore, it is quite difficult to verify
the integrity of the control VM. The external adversaries can compromise the current
cloud TCB via the vulnerabilities on both control VM [6] [7] [8] and cloud hypervi-
sor [9] [10]. After the attack succeeds, the adversary will disclose user’s privacy by
using the administrator privilege of cloud platform. In current cloud design, the cloud
users can only deploy VMs in non-root mode. The inside attackers (malicious cloud
administrators) can disclose user’s privacy by using the privilege of cloud providers,
while the cloud users are not aware. Additionally, current cloud users cannot enrol in
the privacy management. Hence, cloud providers are difficult to convince users that
their private data are well protected.
One possible solution is homomorphic cryptography [59] which protects users’
private data by encrypting before users submit them to cloud providers. The ho-
momorphic cryptography technology also allows CPU operates arbitrary computing
on the encrypted data. However homomorphic cryptography cannot offer practi-
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cal performance at current state [60]. Another solution to protect users’ privacy is
completely removing the privilege of cloud provider. For example, NoHype [16] re-
moves the privileged VM (e.g. dom0 or hostOS) assigned by cloud providers and
only keeps significant management in cloud platform (e.g. VM initialization and mi-
gration). However, such design disables the cloud provider’s ability to manage and
protect cloud resources. Cloud providers will not deploy Virtual Machine Inspector
(VMI) [61] to detect virus or spam software over VM’s side.
Although homomorphic encryption [60] can solve the above privacy issues, it does
not offer practical performance solution yet. Another scenario to solve cloud privacy
issues is Self-Service Cloud computing (SSC) [15] which separates the privileges of
Dom0 into multiple domains, user domains and an MTSD domain. The MTSD
domain checks regulatory compliances mutually agreed upon the cloud provider and
the clients. However, the TCB size of SSC is still too large and the separated small
domains are still running in the root mode.
We propose a new cloud architecture - MyCloud which eliminates the privilege of
cloud providers to fight against inside adversaries and reduces the TCB size to block
external adversaries. In MyCloud, due to the small TCB size, it becomes practical
for the cloud providers to verify the integrity of hypervisor. Meanwhile the cloud
users are able to manage their private data by themselves and set up the protection
policy via hypercall offered by MyCloud hypervisor. The contribution of MyCloud is
as follows:
 We propose a new virtualization architecture, MyCloud, to support user-configured
privacy protection. MyCloud eliminate the privilege of cloud providers so that
the malicious administrators do not have privileges to breach users’ privacy.
 We minimize the TCB of MyCloud by removing the control VM from the root
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mode of the processor. Thus, the external adversaries are difficult to find vul-
nerabilities in MyCloud platform.
 We implement a prototype of MyCloud on x86 platform, which has acceptable
performance overhead but much stronger security protections.
4.2 Design
4.2.1 Threat Mode and Assumptions
The most popular threat is external attack which will compromise the control
VM or cloud provider through vulnerabilities [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]. Then the external
adversaries can disclose users’ privacy by using the privilege of cloud platform.
Inside attack is another threat on users’ privacy. We distinguish malicious cloud
administrators from cloud providers. Usually, well-known enterprises such as Google
and Amazon are motivated to protect users’ privacy, which can improve their reputa-
tion and attract more customers. On the contrary, the cloud administrators employed
by cloud providers, are very likely to breach users’ privacy for pursuing monetary ben-
efits. Even if the cloud administrator is benign, he may make mistakes by accident
and cause privacy breach. Therefore, only cloud administrators are considered adver-
sarial in this project.
Physical attacks or other hardware attacks are not considered. The attack
launched from System Management Mode (SMM) [62] of processors is not included
either, because a proper configuration of the System Range Register (SMRR) is re-
quired to ensure this assumption.
In MyCloud design, we assume that the hardware is equipped with Trusted
Execution Technology (TXT). Therefore, the integrity of crucial components in TCB
can be measured. Additionally, we assume the physical device in cloud environment
33
is able to support Intel Vt-c technology [63] which can offer 255 virtualized devices
to cloud users. MyCloud will directly assign these devices to cloud users.
In this project, we assume that the swap area of the guest VMs is turned off or
the swapped pages are encrypted in order to protect the guest VM space.
4.2.2 Design Goals
The principle of MyCloud design is to provide privacy protection mechanism
but not the policy. The primary goal of MyCloud is to enable configurable privacy
protection and isolate users privacy from other VMs including the control VM. In
addition, the MyCloud design eliminates the privilege of cloud providers to stop
inside attacks and reduce the TCB size to protect privacy from external attack. The
detailed design considerations are as follows.
1. Offer Users-Configured Privacy Protection In MyCloud, an Access Control Ma-
trices (ACM) is maintained in hypervisor memory in order to record user’s
configurations on privacy protection. The cloud users are able to set up ACM
via the hypercall offered by cloud hypervisor. The control VM has no access
permissions to any of the guest VM unless the guest VM grants the permission.
By default, no access permission is granted to the cloud provider.
2. Minimize TCB Size The TCB size of the cloud architecture with MyCloud
should be as small as possible. Hence, the external adversaries cannot detect
the vulnerabilities easily. Also the approach to measure the integrity of My-
Cloud implementation has restrictions on the TCB size. For example the recent
successful report of formal verification shows the capability of a general-purpose
kernel with ￿8.7K LOCs [64]. Therefore, we need to control the TCB size by
including only security related or crucial functionalities.
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3. Isolate Cloud Users Space in VM Level The isolation granularity is the VM level
in Iaas Cloud, because VM is a simple encapsulation of privacy for each cloud
user. Protecting privacy at the VM level is more likely to preserve backward-
compatibility, without the need of modifying OS kernels and applications.
4. Eliminate the Privilege of Cloud Providers. In order to protect users’ privacy
from inside attack, MyCloud should alleviate the privilege of cloud providers.
The cloud providers need to request user’s permission before perform privileged
work (e.g. spam inspection). However, it can normally perform cloud resource
management (allocation and migration).
4.2.3 MyCloud Architecture
Intel virtualization extension VMX [39] and AMD SVM [65] will divide the CPU
privilege mode into root and non-root. In each mode, there are four privileged levels
from ring 0 to ring 3 where ring 0 has the highest privileged level. In the operating
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system, the OS kernel is running in ring 0 and applications are executed in ring 3.
Figure 8 shows the architectures of both KVM [2] and Xen [1] In both archi-
tecture, the control VM created by cloud providers does not have a separate VMCS
for virtual machine context switching so it runs in the root mode. The management
tools and device drivers provided by cloud providers are running in the control VM
at root mode. QEMU is also executed in the root mode to handle exceptions from
guest VM. Moreover, since the control VM is in the root mode, the control VM is
able to manipulate the VMCS structures of all guest VMs and the page tables of
all other VMs. The guest VM is placed in non-root mode under the monitoring of
the control VM. It is impossible to protect any guest VMs from the malicious cloud
administrators.
Compared with existing cloud design, figure 9 shows the architecture of MyCloud.
Only the cloud hypervisor runs in the root mode and maintains security related com-
ponents in the TCB. In our design, the scheduler is a timer triggered preemptive
scheduler against DoS attacks from any VM running on the platform. Memory iso-
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Table 2.: Access Control Matrix of MyCloud.
(A-Allocation, M-Migration, D-Deallocation, H-Hyper Calls, R-Read, W-Write)
Components VMM Control VM VMi VM j ACMi ACM j
VMM Full Full Full Full Full Full
Control VM H Full A/M/D/ACMi A/M/D/ACM j R R
VMi H Full ACM j R/W
VM j H ACMi Full R/W
lation is also enforced by the MyCloud hypervisor. I will describe these components
implementation in the Section 4.3. In MyCloud design, there is no operating system
running in the processor’s root mode. Therefore, no VM, including the control VM,
is more privileged than others, or can manipulate any others. The access permissions
are specified by an Access Control Matrix (ACM) in the cloud hypervisor. According
to the ACM, the control VM can access a guest VM’s space if and only if the guest
VM explicitly grants the permission.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 User-Configured Access Control
As shown in Figure 9, MyCloud design removes the privileges of the control VM
and enables cloud users to configure the privacy protection on Access Control Matrix
(ACM) via the hypercall provided by MyCloud hypervisor. ACM is maintained in
hypervisor’s memory at root mode. Any access to modify ACM will be trapped and
checked by MyCloud hypervisor.
The ACM allows a cloud user to choose which part of private memory in the
user’s VM space can be accessed by the cloud provider or other guest VMs. As
shown in Table 2, ACMi is the Access Control Matrix of VMi. The access permissions
design of MyCloud architecture is completely different from any of the existing cloud
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platforms. Most existing designs assign full privileges to the control VM, which causes
security problems once the control VM is compromised. Even worse, users have no
privacy if the control VM has full privileges.
In ACM, only the hypervisor owns the full privilege of the whole cloud platform
such as accessing physical memory belong to cloud users and cloud providers as well
as modifying the ACM table as the request of cloud users. Each cloud user can
modify the access permissions to the user’s space. By default, all accesses by other
users including the control VM are prohibited. However, cloud users can grant access
permissions to other users, or the cloud provider to enable information sharing or
virus-scan.
In MyCloud, ACMi of a guest VMi is implemented by a Access Control List (ACL)
that specifies memory regions, VM identifiers, and access permissions. When a guest
VM or the control VM wants to access a memory region of other VMs for executing
privileged operations, e.g., doing Virtual Machine Introspection [61] for virus scan,
the VM initiates a HyperCall to request the operation. The hypervisor will check the
requests against the ACL of the visited VM. If the access is permitted, the hypervisor
will conduct the operation on behalf of the requesting VM. Otherwise, the access will
be denied.
Figure 10 shows a sequence of machine instruction level operations on how the
ACM is set and how one VM checks the access request against the ACM. In the figure,
by utilizing a HyperCall, VMA can initialize ACMA on ACM. If VMB wants to access
the memory of VMA , VMA should grant VMB the permissions by sending MyCloud
hypervisor a hypercall to modify ACMA. After that, When VMB is scheduled and
try to access VMA’s memory, MyCloud hypervisor can intercept this activity by EPT
violation. Then MyCloud hypervisor can check the access permission on ACM and
allow VMB complete the privileged work e.g., reading VMA’s kernel data structures.
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Note that we do not need security keys for VMs to implement the HyperCall.
The hypervisor assign each guest VM a different identifier (VPID) in VMCSs when
cloud users create guest VMs. It is impossible for one VMi to set up ACM j if i 6= j.
4.3.2 Memory and Device Isolation
Intel hardware virtualization provides extended page table (EPT) to translate
guest physical address (GPA) to host physical address (HPA). MyCloud will use
EPT table to verify the access permission to users memory space. In EPT table, we
can mark the host page table as read only so that any address translation on EPT
will be trapped by MyCloud hypervisor due to EPT violation. MyCloud hypervisor
will acquire the address space from VMEXIT data structure and check the access
permission on ACM.
In guest VM, the guest page table (gPt) specified by CR3 register of guest VM
is responsible for translating guest virtual address (GVA) to guest physical address
(GPA). EPT table controlled by the hypervisor is used to translate GPA to HPA. The
address of EPT is specified by a VMCS filed (VMCS.EPTP). As shown in Figure 11,
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MyCloud sets up the EPT and MMU will automatically translate guest physical
address to machine address. Once the EPT table is set up, memory translation will
be processed by MMU if there is no EPT violation or EPT misconfiguration happens.
The hypervisor will update the EPT table or check the access permission when EPT
violation happens.
Since the control VM has its own EPT and VMCS, it cannot access any other
guest VMs either. The control VM has can configure a resource table about the
current memory allocations. When creating a new VM, the control VM initiates a
hyper call to allocate memory for the guest VM. The hypervisor handles the boot
process of the new guest VM. By default, no access permissions are granted to the
control VM to access the new guest VM space once the memory is allocated.
I/O management is another important issue to consider when MyCloud remove
the control VM from root-mode. Usually, device drivers must directly communicate
with external devices in order to complete the I/O operation. Because including the
40
data structure for multiple device drivers in MyCloud hypervisor will increase the
attack surface, MyCloud hypervisor will allocate each guest VM a dedicated external
device. However, the number of external device in cloud platform is limited. In order
to solve the above problems, MyCloud hypervisor relies on Intel Vt-c [63] technology
to generate maximal 255 physical devices in cloud platform. As shown in Figure 11,the
MyCloud hypervisor is responsible for configuring the I/O interrupt remapping and
DMA remapping page table in Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU)
to assign device to guest VM.
In Intel Vt-c technology, peripheral devices start to support SR-IOV [66] to
enable a Single Root Functions to be prepared as multiple separate physical devices,
called virtual functions (VFs). Therefore, in the opinion of cloud users, there are a
lot of physical devices in the cloud platform supporting SR-IOV. The hypervisor can
program IOMMU and assign any of these devices to a guest VM.
Like MMU that translates virtual address to physical address, the IOMMU takes
care of mapping device virtual address to physical address. With the help of IOMMU,
devices can be directly assigned to VMs. This kind of direct assignment of devices
also provides very fast I/O and eliminates device drivers from root mode. The guest
VMs should prepare specific device drivers for the assigned device and protect private
data sent to the external device by themselves.
4.3.3 Cloud Management and Scheduling
To simplify the system design, MyCloud currently supports two scheduling algo-
rithms, round-robin and simple fair-sharing. In the case of round-robin, every VMCS
is set to have a fixed amount of timer expiration time before the VMENTRY. Timer
expiration will trigger a VMEXIT. In current round-robin method, we only consider
scheduling another VM when the timer expires. The drawback of this method is
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that it lowers the overall CPU utilization if the VM does not have a lot of things to
do. We also implement an algorithm close to fair-sharing that evaluates more often
on whether scheduling another VM to use the CPU upon the number of VMEXITs,
which will improve the CPU utilization.
In traditional cloud architecture, cloud providers will set up the control VM
in the root mode. Cloud providers can control the privileges over cloud users. On
the contrary, MyCloud only allows cloud providers deploy unprivileged control VM
which is responsible for resource management. The management work is indirect and
should be done through the interface offered by MyCloud hypervisor. Any resource
allocation change requested by the control VM will be handled by the hypervisor.
Key management is out of the scope of MyCloud contribution, but a key system
is necessary to ensure authentication and cloud platform verification. In order to
protect the integrity of the platform, DRTM such as Intel TXT/MLE technology
can be used during the boot procedure. In order to allow remote users to attest the
integrity of the platform, MyCloud implements a simple key management mechanism
like CloudVisor [18]. When users create a new VM, they encrypt the VM key (KVM)
and VM image by a public key of TPM (KAIK{KVM | VM imange}) so that only
MyCloud can decrypt and verify the VM key. If the VM key is approved, MyCloud
will store it in hypervisor’ memory space in order to ensure that cloud provider cannot
modify the VM key. Then, MyCloud will send the encrypted hash value of VM image
by using the VM key (KVM{Hash(VM image)}to remote users. Hence, the remote
users can authenticate the integrity of cloud platform.
When cloud users create a VM, MyCloud will allocate the resource under the
request from the control VM. The cloud user will remotely attest the platform and
negotiate a session key with MyCloud. Then, the cloud users can submit an image
with the hash value encrypted by the session key to MyCloud platform. If MyCloud
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Fig. 12.: TCB size comparison of some virtualization architectures.
can successfully verify the image, it will launch the VM until users delete this VM.
If the resources allocated to a guest VM are expired or no longer needed, MyCloud
will destroy the data first then mark the resources as free space to the control VM.
Because the control VM’s memory access is restricted by the ACM and any privileged
CPU or I/O instructions can be captured and check by the MyCloud hypervisor.
The malicious cloud administrator is impossible to breach user’s privacy in MyCloud
platform.
4.4 Evaluation
The TCB size of MyCloud prototype is around 5.8K LOCs including a trusted
bootloader (e.g. tboot [67]) and a verifiable cloud hypervisor. The comparison of the
TCB size with other virtualization techniques is shown in Figure 12. According to
my statistics, MyCloud has the smallest TCB.
Our prototype is built on a hardware platform that has an Intel i7 2600 proces-
sor (with both Vt-x and Vt-d) running at 3.3Ghz, an Intel DQ67SW Motherboard
(Chip: Q67), 4 GB RAM, a 1 TB SATA HDD, and an Intel e1000 ethernet con-
troller. We use Ubuntu 10.04 LTS with linux kernel 2.6.32 for the VM. We deploy
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two bench mark tools on MyCloud prototype – lmbench [68] and compilebench [69].
In order to simplify the prototype implementation, I disable caches and symmetric
multiprocessing processors (SMP) in MyCloud.
4.4.1 Performance Analysis
In order to evaluate the overheads of our platform, we compared the following
five configurations.
1. Run an OS on a bare metal machine, labelled as “No_virt” in the figures.
2. Run MyCloud with only one VM, labelled as “One VM” in the figures.
3. Run MyCloud with two VMs. The light-weight Round-Robin scheduler will be
triggered by VMX CPU timer and the scheduling interval is 10ms, labelled as
“10ms” in the figures.
4. Run MyCloud with two VMs. The light-weight Round-Robin scheduler will be
triggered by VMX CPU timer and the scheduling interval is 20ms, labelled as
“20ms” in the figures.
5. Run MyCloud with two VMs. The scheduling algorithm will allow a busy VM
to take more CPU time (95% CPU time) and assign an idle VM less CPU time
(around 5% CPU time), labelled as “Fair Share” in the figures.
Figure 13 indicates the overhead of CPU computing performance on MyCloud.
The lmbench will evaluate the CPU operations on 32 bit integers, 64 bit integers,
float numbers and double. According to the result shown in figure 13, the enabling
of two VMs slows down the performance by 2%, but the frequency of VM context
switching does not impact the performance very much. Figure 13 also shows the
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Fig. 13.: CPU latency measurements, measured by lmbench.
performance for popular processes like fork, exec and sh. The lmbench contains lots
of context switches which have to be executed in VMX root mode. The frequent
Non-root/Root mode transitions cause the performance reduction of fork and exec
processes. However, in the real world, the applications in the guest VMs do not have
so many context switches. Thus, the real performance of guest VMs in MyCloud
should be better than what we have in the experiments.
Lmbench is also used to measure the overheads in multi-process context switch-
ing. Figure 14 shows the result of latencies when running multiple processes in guest
VMs. When the number of processes increases to 16 and the data size increases to
64K, we can see the context switching efficiency based on the results in Figure 14.
Since the simple scheduler algorithm in MyCloud is very simple and We disable sym-
metric multiprocessing and cache in our platform, the performance overhead reaches
40% in some cases. However, the real performance overhead on context switching
should be much less than the results in Figure 14.
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Figure 15 shows the kernel operation performance measured by compilebench.
The result indicates how greatly the scheduling algorithm imparts the performance.
When there is only one VM, the performance loss is around 21% compared with
the operating system running on bare metal machine. Kernel operation performance
measurement includes operations of computing and memory read/write. Disabling
caches and SMP is still the main cause of overheads.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the results of a comprehensive measurement of
system bandwidth and latencies, including file creation/deletion and virtual memory
latencies as well as local communication bandwidth. From the results we can conclude
that local physical memory access (R/W), file operation and I/O operation do not
have much influence on the guest VM. In addition, the VM scheduling algorithm has
little contribution to the performance loss.
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4.4.2 Security Analysis
Since malicious system administrators are deprived of the privileges to access
users’ privacy, they may hijack the hypercall and change the users’ ACM when guest
VMs are modifying the ACM. MyCloud can defeat against this kind of attacks because
the hypervisor will manage and check all hypercall with assigned VPIDs. In MyCloud,
access control specified by Table 2 is precisely and strictly followed.
The TCB size of MyCloud is greatly reduced by excluding the external drivers,
management tools and complex OS kernels. As long as the TCB is secure, the privacy
protection is guaranteed. Therefore, external adversaries cannot detect the vulner-
abilities easily and take over the privilege of cloud provider after compromising the
control VM.
The control VM is put in the non-root mode. If a malicious administrator at-
tempts to access memory page that belong to cloud users, this activity will be inter-
cepted through an EPT violation and handled by the hypervisor. The hypervisor will
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check whether the access is authorized in the ACM table. The only interface to access
memory of guest VMs is to acquire the permissions from cloud users. Therefore, the
privacy breaching from malicious cloud administrators can be prevented.
Some may concern that if a VM can launch VM-to-VM Deny-of-Service (DoS)
attacks by causing a lot of unauthorized memory accesses. This attack forces the
hypervisor to process VMEXITs frequently, and takes CPU time slices away from
the other VMs. Due to this concern, we provide a simple timer based round-robin
algorithm to protect against DoS attacks. The availability is always guaranteed by
round-robin since time slices are fixed for each VM.
In MyCloud, the cloud provider can only manage cloud resource allocation through
the interface provided by the hypervisor. Any resource allocation requested by the
control VM will be checked and handled by the hypervisor. In this way, the cloud
provider cannot stealthily manipulate the users’ secrets. Moreover, the control VM
is not more privileged than any guest VM. Even if the control VM is compromised
or exploited by inside attackers or malicious codes, the access towards the resources
allocated to guest VMs will be intercepted by MyCloud hypervisor.
Intel Vt-c technology will allow physical device offer 255 virtualized interface to
multiple domains. The MyCloud hypervisor will assign dedicated physical device to
guest VMs by Intel Vt-d technology. In MyCloud, the cloud users should provide
device drivers and protect their privacy from external device by themselves. Since a
VM is usually attached to virtual or physical disks, anything stored in those disks
can be accessed without the control of the VM. Thus, it is the user’s responsibility to
encrypt sensitive data when the data needs to be stored into any storage devices. A
VM’s network traffic should be treated in the same way. Since the cloud provider can
always inspect user’s traffic through an intrusion detection system or network man-
agement software, the users should protect their network traffic through encryption
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if they have privacy concerns.
In MyCloud design, any type of physical attacks including SMM attack is not
taken into consideration. SMRAM and SMM registers are assumed to be protected
and set up properly. However, in order to tamper with the SMM-based attacks, we are
designing a specific BIOS for MyCloud based on SeaBIOS and CoreBoot. The new
BIOS can not only load hypervisor correctly, but also lock the SMRAM by setting the
D_LOCK bit on chipset. Additionally, we remove the redundant codes for booting
and initializing process, further reducing the size of TCB.
4.5 Summary
We propose a new cloud architecture – MyCloud. MyCloud can protect users’
privacy from inside attack because we eliminate the privilege of cloud providers.
MyCloud can also fight against external attack since we remove the control VM, device
driver and management tools from the TCB of the cloud platform. In MyCloud,
users can set up the protection policy in ACM, while cloud providers still manage
cloud resources and access users’ memory with permissions. In that case, cloud users
may participate in cloud management and build mutual trust with cloud providers.
Cloud providers are still able to execute privileged work on user’s VM (inspect spam).
We have built a prototype system of MyCloud on the x86 platform with acceptable
overheads.
However, there are still some flaws in MyCloud architecture. First, many cloud
users are motivated to utilize virtualized device rather than provide device drivers
and manage the dedicated physical device. Assign a physical device also reduce the
flexibility of platform, because users have to change the device drivers if a new physical
device is added. Second, most cloud users do not have enough technique and budgets
to protect their privacy from malicious device drivers. Cloud providers or hypervisor
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should provide security features to protect users privacy. Hence, we propose a new
architecture MyCloud SEP to solve the problems in MyCloud.
51
CHAPTER 5
DETANGLING RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FROM CLOUD
PLATFORM WITH MYCLOUD SEP
5.1 Introduction
Recent research including MyCloud has developed new cloud architectures to
protect cloud users‘ privacy. However, current cloud architecture either has limited
functionalities in the hypervisor or the TCB size is too large to be protected. For
example, Self Service Cloud (SSC) [15] divided the privileges of Dom0 into smaller
domain. However, the smaller domains are still running in the same privilege mode
as legacy Dom0. The TCB size of SSC is not reduced because SSC does not move
the functionalities of Dom0 (control VM) to non-privilege mode. Our previous work
MyCloud [55] can achieve a verifiable TCB size. MyCloud eliminate the privilege
of the control VM and create a user configurable Access Control Matrix (ACM) in
the hypervisor. However, the functionality of MyCloud hypervisor is very limited.
Cloud users have to manage the external device and install drivers by themselves.
This architecture design decreases the flexibility of cloud platform. Usually, cloud
users do not have enough technique and budget to update cloud drivers and protect
privacy from external devices.
I propose another cloud architecture – MyCloud SEP (SEP for separation) to
protect users’ privacy and provide device management for cloud users. In MyCloud
SEP, cloud users do not need to manage real physical devices and install device driver.
Instead, MyCloud SEP will include a resource allocator and real device drivers in non-
root mode. MyCloud SEP hypervisor can trap the device/driver instructions based
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on AHCI protocol. Like MyCloud, the cloud users can configure the policy of privacy
protection on assigned device resource. If there is any malicious access on their
device resource, the hypervisor will prohibit it. Such design increase the flexibility of
cloud device management. In this project, we use disk management as an exmple to
explain our technology. The similar scenario can be applied to other types of resource
management.
In MyCloud SEP, since the component of resource management is moved to
the non-root mode, the TCB size of MyCloud SEP is not greatly reduced. Compared
with MyCloud, MyCloud SEP can support better functionalities without significantly
increasing the TCB size. The major contribution of MyCloud SEP is as follows:
1. Protect cloud users‘ privacy from inside attack and external attack as well as
provide full functionality of a hypervisor without increasing the TCB size too
much.
2. Separate the resource management from privacy protection component in order
to reduce the TCB size.
3. We implement a prototype MyCloud SEP and the performance evaluation shows
an acceptable overheads.
5.2 Design
5.2.1 Threat Mode and Assumptions
Similar to MyCloud, the MyCloud SEP should protect user’s privacy from inside
and external attacks. The malicious cloud administrators may breach user’s privacy
by abusing the privilege of cloud providers. In addition, any mistakes they made
by accident may breach user’s privacy or help external adversaries to compromise
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Fig. 18.: MyCloud SEP architecture Design
the cloud platform. Usually, the external adversaries can take over the cloud via the
vulnerabilities found in the device drivers, device emulation and software components
in the control VM.
Physical attack is also out of the scope of this paper. In this project, cloud
providers can utilize Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [45] and chip-based
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [70] to verify the integrity of MyCloud SEP. Cur-
rently, many server with Intel chipset can support this measurement features. Sim-
ilarly, the System Management Range Register is properly configured in order to
prohibit the attack from System Management Mode (SMM).
5.2.2 Architecture Overview
Figure 18 explains the architecture of MyCloud SEP. The cloud hypervisor runs
in the root mode, while other VMs or management components are running in non-
root mode. After MyCloud SEP is booted, the logical processor stays in the root
mode. The CPU can complete the privilege mode transition by executing specific
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VMX instructions. When the guest VM executes the privileged instructions, the
processor will automatically transmit to the root mode and trigger the hypervisor
handler via VMEXITs.
In Figure 18, virtual machines and virtual disk manager (VDM) are launched
in non-root mode. Unlike the existing techniques, VDM is not part of the TCB
because all physical disks accesses made by VDM are examined by the MyCloud SEP
hypervisor. In MyCloud SEP design, only the hypervisor and hardware are in the
TCB. All guest VMs, control VM, device drivers and device emulator are running in
the non-root mode. The hypervisor can intercept all privileged instructions executed
in non-root mode. Compared with other Type 1 cloud platforms (e.g. Xen), the TCB
size is remarkably reduced.
As shown in Figure 18, the hypervisor is responsible to isolate users’ privacy from
malicious cloud administrators and device drivers. Additionally, the hypervisor will
check permission of resource access including physical memory and disks of guest VMs.
The guest VMs are running as it is in bare-mental machine. The cloud users can design
the policy of privacy protection on their memory and disks. Unlike MyCloud, the
cloud users do not need to manage the assigned external devices and install drivers by
themselves. The virtual disk manager (VDM) is used to support device virtualization
and manage device drivers to implement I/O operations. The hypervisor can invoke
the VDM by injecting specific interrupt for I/O operations. The control VM in
MyCloud SEP can design the migration strategy and check the platform resource via
hyperCall. The functionality of each component in MyCloud SEP will be explained
the following sections.
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5.2.2.1 MyCloud SEP Hypervisor
The hypervisor is the only component running in the root mode and owning the
privilege to access all cloud resources. Before the hypervisor is launched, a trustable
boot loader should verify the integrity of the execution environment using Intel TXT
technology. The initialization process of hypervisor needs to complete the following
tasks.
1. Detect E820 map and allocate the available physical memory for each compo-
nent.
2. Detect all PCI devices installed in cloud platform.
3. Configure EPT in order to isolate guest VM’ memory from the control VM in
order to prohibit the access made by malicious cloud administrators.
4. Configure DMA Remapping Page Table in order to isolate the memory access
space of external device. Thus, the memory space assigned to cloud users can
be protected from malicious devices.
5. Copy the hypervisor into specific memory space.
After the initialization process, the hypervisor should complete the following tasks in
order to launch the guest VMs, the control VM and virtual disk manager.
1. Create VMCS structure for the control VM, guest VMs and Virtual Disk Man-
ager.
2. Create Access Control Matrix and Resource Allocation Recorder.
3. Allocate resources (e.g. memory and disk) to guest VMs.
4. Schedule the guest VMs.
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5.2.2.2 Virtual Disk Manager
As shown in Figure 19, both KVM and Xen rely on real device drivers installed in
the privileged VM to communicate with physical disks. The hypervisor will intercept
the device operations in guest VMs and forward this activity to the privileged VM.
Xen deploys a split-driver mechanism to deliver the I/O operation, but KVM will rely
on the existing linux system call. After the privileged VM completes I/O operation,
the hypervisor will inject the result to the guest VM. Since the privileged VM is
running in the root-mode, neither the hypervisor nore guest VMs can monitor how
the device drivers complete the I/O operation.
I implement a MyCloud SEP prototype to explain how to separate disk man-
agement from security management. The virtual disk structure in MyCloud SEP is
illustrated in Figure 20. Each virtual machine including the control VM only have
access to limited number of disks in the virtual disk pool. The virtual disk manager
(VDM) manages the disk resources.
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All disk access will be checked by the hypervisor against the ACM. Since, the
device drivers and resource allocator work in non-root mode, MyCloud SEP will grant
an access if the access is permitted in the ACM. During the initialization process of
a VM, the device drivers need a lot of information such as manufacture ID, etc,.
MyCloud SEP will intercept these instructions and provide an emulated device to
guest VMs.
Since the device drivers may breach user’s privacy, MyCloud SEP needs to mon-
itor I/O operations from device drivers. In MyCloud SEP, the VDM is just a piece of
codes which provides Intel AHCI [71] emulation and communicates with local SATA
disks. The design reduce the attack surface by running the VDM in non-root mode.
In order to monitor the activity of disk drivers, the hypervisor will also create a VMCS
structure and configure which instructions should be intercepted.
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5.2.2.3 Control VM
In MyCloud SEP, the control VM is launched in non-root mode. The hypervisor
will create VMCS for VMCS so that any memory access not in its EPT table will
be trapped by the hypervisor. If the guest VM does not grant cloud providers access
permissions, the hypervisor will prohibit the memory access of the control VM.
MyCloud SEP allows the control VM manage resources allocation and check
resource utilization through HyperCall API. The control VM can migrate VMs as
long as it follows resource allocation procedures and the migration plan does not
violate policies specified in ACM.
5.2.2.4 Guest VM
Although guest VMs are running the non-root mode, cloud users can implement
privileged work such as memory introspection. Also, the cloud users can modify the
privacy protection policy via HyperCall provided by the hypervisor. Normally, the
guest VMs are running as the same way in physical machine. The hypervisor will
trap all privileged instructions of guest VMs and resume VMs after completing the
security check.
5.3 Implementation
5.3.1 Access Control on I/O operations
The privilege design of MyCloud SEP is different from existing cloud platform,
since the control VM does not have privileges over the user’s privacy. In MyCloud SEP
design, the control VM is removed from the root mode and all access permissions are
set up in the ACM by cloud users. MyCloud SEP hypervisor relies on Intel Extended
Page Table (EPT) technology to intercept any memory accesses. Also, MyCloud
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Table 3.: Access Control Matrix in MyCloud SEP (VDM-Virtual Disk Manager,
CVM-Control Virtual Machine, H-Hyper Calls, R-Read, W-Write, P- Permission Re-
quired )
Components Hypervisor CVM VDM ResourceRegioni ResourceRegion j
Hypervisor Full Full Full Full Full
CVM H Full P P
VDM H Full
VMi H Full
VM j H Full
SEP use Intel VT-d technology [72] [73] [74] to monitor all I/O operations. Once a
resource access is invoked by guest VM, Virtual Disk Manager or the control VM,
the hypervisor will verify the permission over ACM.
Like MyCloud, the MyCloud SEP still maintains an Access Control Matrix which
is configurable by users. Table 3 shows the details of ACM in MyCloud SEP. The
ACM stores access permissions for each VM and resource regions. Cloud users are
assigned special HyperCall to set up the ACM. In ACM, we use Virtual Disk Manager
(VDM) as an example of resource manager which can only access to the allocated
resource after the hypervisor verify the permission.
As shown in Talbe 3, only the hypervisor has full access rights to all resources
in MyCloud SEP. The control VM is assigned the same privilege level as guest VMs.
Therefore, the cloud administrator can only access resources shared by cloud users. If
the cloud administrator needs to access user resources, it has to acquire the permission
from cloud users. If the cloud users allow cloud providers access their privacy, they
can change the ACM by a series of hyperCalls. Besides, VDM is responsible to provide
device emulator and complete I/O instructions of guest VMs. All activities of VDM
are under the control of hypervisor which can verify the access permission of VDM
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against ACM.
In MyCloud SEP, the resources are managed in the unit of a ”resource region” as
shown in Table 3. A resource region is specified by {start address, end address}.
A region is not necessary to be the full address space for a VM. For example, a VM
can have a disk block ResourceRegioni {(track #100, head #0, sector #15),
(track #500, head #0, sector #15)}.
Figure 21 introduces the procedure of how hypervisor assign a free block of re-
source to the guest VM. In step 1, when the hypervisor initializes the hardware, it
sends I/O commands to port 0xcf8 and 0xcfc in order to obtain the configuration
of each PCI device. The acquired information is packaged in PCI device structures
including base address (BAR), specified command and I/O ports etc,. The hyper-
visor will allocate the memory space for each device and register these allocation
information in a data structure – Resource Access Recorder (RAR).
In step 2, the guest VM sends a HyperCall to the hypervisor in order to apply
new resource region. To improve the compatibility for different resource allocators
and reduce the TCB size, MyCloud SEP allows multiple resource allocators in the
non-root mode. The HyperCall handler will send VMLAUNCH instructions to invoke
the resource allocators in step 3. The resource allocator will generate the allocation
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plan and inform the hypervisor by another HyperCall in step 4. Since the resource
allocator is not trusted, the hypervisor will verify the allocation plan by checking the
RAR table. The hypervisor should guarantee the allocator only assign free resources
to the guest VM. If the plan is approved, the hypervisor will update the RAR and
ACM table in step 5. In step 6, the hypervisor will resume the guest VM with a new
allocated resource region. Finally, the hypervisor resume the execution of resource
manager in step 7.
The process to free a resource region is similar. First of all, a guest VM sends
the request to the hypervisor by HyperCall. The hypervisor invokes the resource
allocator, then verifies the security of new resource allocation plan by searching the
RAR table and checking ACM. Finally, the hypervisor will resume the guest VM and
resource manager after updating the ACM table.
5.3.2 Resource Management
Figure 20 explain the resource management in MyCloud SEP by using disks
management. The control VM is constrained in the non-root mode, thus has to
access virtual disks as the same way as guest VMs. During the boot of guest VMs,
OS will request device information such as device ID, mentor ID etc,. These requests
will be trapped into the hypervisor then handled by a device emulator. In this stage,
the device emulator will offer virtualized device information to support the boot of
guest VM.
In order to manage the disk allocation, the MyCloud SEP implement a linear
mapping from a logical disk space a physical disk space. Figure 22 explains how the
physical disk blocks are mapped to virtual disks. The hypervisor track each physical
block by three parameters: cylinder, sector and head. When users try to expand the
size of virtual disks, the hypervisor should allocate free physical disks to virtual disks
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and update the Resource Access Recorder (RAR).
MyCloud SEP should not only verify the security of resource allocation plan made
by VDM, but also monitor activity of drivers when completing I/O operations. In
MyCloud SEP, we rely on AHCI protocol which is widely used in communication with
Intel SATA disks. The hypervisor can understand the Advanced Host and Controller
Interface (AHCI) [71] information throughout PCI configuration space (0xcf8 and
0xcfc). The RAR table will be used to store these allocation information such as
base address, AHCI specific I/O port and registers etc,. When the users request
new disk spaces, the VDM will decide which part of physical disks can be assigned.
Then, the hypervisor can update the ACM and RAR table. Since the device drivers
complete I/O operations based on AHCI and MyCloud SEP understand the AHCI 1.3
specification, each I/O command sent from drivers will be trapped and traversed by
the hypervisor. Afterwards, the hypervisor will verify the access permission against
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ACM and only execute the approved I/O instructions.
In nature, the AHCI encompasses a PCI device and the AHCI bus adapter is
composed of a PCI header and PCI Capabilities. In the booting stage of guest VM,
the OS will try to acquire the PCI configuration by sending I/O command to port
0xcf8 and 0xcfc. The hypervisor can set up the VMCS and ask CPU to intercept
any I/O commands sent to both ports. Therefore, the hypervisor can handle the I/O
commands and implement device emulation.
Figure 23 explains how MyCloud SEP verify the access permission of I/O com-
mands. We use I/O write as an example. According to the AHCI specification, When
an application in the guest VM sends a disk write request to OS kernel, the kernel
will issue a series of I/O commands to configure the specific I/O ports and transfer
data with AHCI HBA. Because the hypervisor can configure the VMCS and trap
these I/O commands. Then, The hypervisor will check if the trapped I/O commands
has permission to the resource in ACM table. . After approved, the hypervisor will
trigger the VDM and deliver the command to the device emulator. The VDM handles
the commands and calls physical disk drivers to execute the I/O write operation.
In order to transfer data from memory to disk, the untrustworthy device drivers
in VDM has to access physical memory and I/O ports. The hypervisor will also verify
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the permission of resource access made by device drivers. If the trapped I/O command
indicates the disk is ready to transfer data, the hypervisor will assign the physical
disk to the VDM using DMA remapping technology. MyCloud SEP will configure
the remapping table in order to prohibit the drivers access resources of other VMs.
To prevent VDM drivers from reconfiguring the device via I/O command, the
hypervisor records the boundary of each VM in resource region when users send I/O
commands to prepare disk operations. If the access is out of the scope of users-
specified resourced region, VMEXIT will be caused and the hypervisor will block the
command. After VDM finishes the write operation, hypervisor can resume the guest
VM.
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5.3.3 Memory Isolation
5.3.3.1 Memory Access Isolation
MyCloud SEP should isolate the memory of each guest VM from the control
VM relying on the Intel Extended Page Table (EPT) technology. In the memory
of hypervisor, MyCloud SEP will build a 4-layer EPT table for each VM before
users create the guest VM. The EPT base pointer in VMCS is configured by the
hypervisor to record the entry address of EPT table. When a memory translation is
made by the kernel of guest VM, Memory Management Unit (MMU) will traverse the
EPT table and translate the Guest Virtual Address (GVA) to Host Physical Address
(HPA). Since there is no overlapped host physical memory space in EPT table, any
guest VM cannot access the memory space assigned to other VMs. If a page fault
happens in the guest VM, it can be trapped by the hypervisor through VMEXIT.
The hypervisor can update the EPT by adding a free page into the EPT table then
resume the execution of the guest VM.
5.3.3.2 Device Access Isolation
Most of devices rely on IOMMU to translate Device Virtual Address (DVA) to
Host Physical Address (HPA) and use DMA to deliver data between devices and
memory. In order to protect users’ privacy from malicious devices and drivers, My-
Cloud SEP implements Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O and trap
the I/O commands by configuring the VMCS. Before devices execute DMA access,
MyCloud SEP will elaborately build Context-Entry Table (CET) in IOMMU to imple-
ment DMA Remapping for each device. IOMMU users hPCIbus;deviceand f unctioni
to index the CET table and find the Multi-Level Page Table to translate the DVA. Al-
though the CPU cannot control the DMA access, the hypervisor still receives VMEX-
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ITs if the device access the memory unmapped in Multi-Level Page Table. In our
prototype, we implement the IOMMU access isolation for SATA disks.
5.3.3.3 RAR Isolation
Figure 24 explains how to implement the isolation in MyCloud SEP. Besides the
users’ privacy, MyCloud SEP also protects Memory Mapped I/O space, PCI device
configuration space and MSR mapped space. For each PCI device, the data and I/O
command lists are stored in Command List and Received FIS as shown in Figure 24.
The entry point is specified at chipset register PxCLB and PxFB. The hypervisor
will set up these registers and assign EPT-mapped memory to the devices. In order
to protect PCI configuration space, the hypervisor will monitor all I/O commands
related to 0xcfc and 0xcf8. Therefore, the hypervisor can prohibit the malicious
drivers from compromising these I/O ports.
5.4 Evaluation
Table 4 shows the specification of evaluation platform. In order to evaluation
the overheads of MyCloudSEP on I/O instructions, we test the number of VMexits
and time consumption when creating 1GB empty file with 4KB block size and 8KB
block size. Besides, we test the overheads on CPU instruction and memory access by
benchmark. lmbench [68] [75].
We design four test cases as follows:
 No_Virt: Run one OS in the bare mental machine.
 One_VM: Run MyCloud SEP with one VM.
 Round_Robin: Run MyCloud SEP with two VMs. Scheduling interval is
10ms and the switch is triggered by VMX preemption timer.
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Table 4.: Evaluation Platform Specification
CPU Intel i7 2600
Motherboard Intel DQ67SW chipset
Memory 4GB
Disk 1TB SATA 7200rpm
Operating System Ubuntu 10.04
Kernel Version 2.6.32
Null Call Null I/O Int Operation    Int64 
Operation
   Float 
Operation
  Double 
Operation
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Fig. 25.: The overhead of CPU instructions
 Fair_Share: Run MyCloud SEP with two VMs. One busy VM takes over 95%
CPU time and the other VM is only assigned 5% CPU time. The scheduler is
also triggered by VMX preemption timer.
5.4.1 CPU Instructions
lmbench benchmark is able to test the time consumption when MyCloud SEP
executes some popular CPU instructions. For example, CALL, I/O operation, Int
operation, Float operation and double operation. According to the result of bench-
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Fig. 26.: The overhead of memory access
mark evaluation shown in Figure 25, MyCloud SEP design can barely increase the
overhead when the system executes a CPU instruction. Only when CPU instruct
64bit operations, MyCloud SEP will cause extra overhead.
5.4.2 Memory Access
Figure 26 shows the evaluation results on memory access made by lmbench bench-
mark. When there is one VM running in MyCloud SEP, the performance of memory
R/W is not impacted. Because we only deploy simple round-robin and fair-share
scheduler algorithm, the performance overhead is 2%.
5.4.3 I/O Operation
Figure 27 shows the type and numbers of VMEXITs when MyCloud SEP creates
one 1GB empty file with 4KB block size. The guest VM will introduce 2 105
VMEXITS. Most of them are caused by I/O instructions.
Figure 28 introduces the similar evaluation results when MyCloud SEP creates
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one 1GB empty file with 8KB block size. Because the block size is bigger, guest VM
will generate less VMEXITS (1:38105). Although the number of VMEXITS looks
huge, the extra overhead is acceptable.
Figure 29 compares the MyCloud SEP with KVM on time consumption of cre-
ating the 1GB file. We also set the block size as 4KB and 8KBM on both of them.
MyCloud SEP takes 20% more time than KVM. The overhead is caused because I/O
operations will be trapped by hypervisor and examined against ACM. In addition,
the evaluation result shows that the bigger block size is, the less VMEXITs will be
caused. The time consumption with 8KB block size is less than that of 4KB block
size.
5.5 Security Analysis
The goal of MyCloud SEP design is to fully protect the users’ privacy from both
inside attack and external attack. MyCloud SEP offers guest VMs the ability to
configure the resource access permission in ACM and share the resource with others
by a series of HyperCalls. In MyCloud SEP, the control VM, guest VMs and virtual
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disk manager can only access the assigned resources. Any illegal resource access and
attempt ti modify ACM will be detected and prohibited by the hypervisor.
5.5.1 Inside Attack
5.5.1.1 Cloud Administrator
The malicious cloud administrator may abuse the privilege of the control VM to
disclose users’ privacy [58]. In MyCloud SEP design, the control VM is running in
the non-root mode and under the control of hypervisor. If the administrator tries to
dump the users’ memory, a memory read instruction should be executed. CPU will
trap this instruction and the hypervisor will stop the memory read activity because it
violates the permission in ACM. Therefore, the malicious cloud administrator cannot
access a guest VM space unless the guest VM explicitly grants the access through the
ACM.
5.5.1.2 Applications of Guest VMs
In the previous design, the attacker may compromise users’ applications and
gain the privilege in the guest VM. Cloud users is also possible to install malicious
applications in their VMs. For example, attack [76] shows that the vulnerabilitiy in
JRE 6 is able to allow context-dependent attackers to gain privileges via malicious
application or applet. Afterwards, the attacker will acquire the privileges to read and
write local files. In MyCloud SEP, the hypervisor will trap the activities of writing
and reading local files. Since the attacker is not approved in the ACM, this attack
will not compromise users’ privacy.
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5.5.1.3 Device Driver
In current cloud design, the malicious drivers can compromise the functionalities
of guest VMs. For example, the backend driver in Xen allows malicious guest OS
users to cause a denial of service via a kernel thread leak, which prevents the device
and guest OS from being shut down or create a zombie domain [77].
MyCloud SEP can protect the cloud users from this attack, because the VMs
scheduling is control by the hypervisor. MyCloud SEP replies on a preemption timer
in VMCS in order to allow other VMs execute CPU instructions. Since the verifiable
hypervisor is running in the root mode, the scheduler can work properly.
5.5.1.4 Management Tools
Due to the vulnerability of management tool in the control VM, the malicious
users may access to the management functionalities and cause a DoS attack. For
example [78], use-after-free vulnerability in the function of Xen 4.1.x through 4.3.x,
when using a multithreaded toolstack, does not properly handle a failure by the
xc_cpumap_alloc function, which allows local users with access to management func-
tions to cause a denial of service (heap corruption) and possibly gain privileges via
unspecified vectors. [79] shows that cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in we-
baccess in VMware allows attackers to inject arbitrary web script via vectors related
to context data.
In MyCloud SEP, both management tools of the control VM and the guest VMs
are running in the non-root mode. Only the hypervisor can call invoke the control
VM and call the management function by VMRESUME. If the malicious VM tries
to access the functions of the control VM, the hypervisor will intercept and prohibit
the call instruction from guest VMs, because the guest VM is against the permission
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in ACM.
5.5.1.5 Malicious Cloud Users
Due to the cloud business model, each person has a chance to deploy guest VMs
on cloud providers. Even the attacker can set up a guest VMs and compromise other
guest VMs in the same cloud. For example, [80] [6] vulnerability in the virtual
machine display functions in VMware Workstation allows guest OS users to execute
arbitrary code on host OS. Therefore the attacker could execute malicious code on
host OS and disclose the privacy of other legitimate VMs.
In MyCloud SEP, this attack will not happen because the display functions of
host OS are running in the non-root mode. Even if the host OS is compromised, the
attacker cannot acquire any privacy information of other VMs. All resources accesses
are under the control of ACM in the hypervisor. The attackers in the non-root mode
are impossible to detect and compromise the hypervisor.
5.5.2 External Attack
The most of external attacks come from malicious guest VMs, targeting at the
hypervisor, innocent cloud users and the control VM. In MyCloud SEP, users’ privacy
is isolated from other components in the cloud. The TCB component of MyCloud SEP
is the light-weighted hypervisor, which can be verified by Intel TXT technology. Only
the hypervisor is granted the full privileges to access all resources. The malicious guest
VMs are running in the non-root mode, any access to other VMs and the control VM
will be intercepted by the hypervisor. Compromising a guest VM or other components
out of the hypervisor does not gain access to any other guest VMs since the ACM is
maintained and enforced by the hypervisor. The only interface to access other VM’s
space is acquiring the permission in ACM after approved users modifying the access
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ruls by HyperCall.
The same protection goes with disk drivers and device emulator. The disk drivers
are in the VDM, the control VM cannot directly send malicious I/O commands or
interrupts to access guest VMs. Only the hypervisor can invoke the VDM to handle
the trapped I/O commands.
The attackers cannot breach users privacy through PCI devices either. MyCloud
SEP configure the IOMMU to translate the VDA, therefore, any malicious DMA
access will be prohibited by the hypervisor. The hypervisor first identifies all PCI
devices at initialization process. Then, the hypervisor records MMIO and PCI Con-
figuration space in RAR for each device. In that case, MyCloud SEP can prevent the
attackers from overlapping the device memory to disclose users’ private data.
5.6 Summary
In MyCloud SEP design, we separate resource allocation and management in
hypervisor. MyCloud SEP is able to provide the resource management modules, but
the TCB size of the hypervisor is significantly reduced. In our design, the hypervisor
deploy ACM fro the resource manager, control VM and guest VM in order to identify
the resource access. Hence, the privacy in guest VM is protected. In MyCloud SEP,
the functionality and privacy protection is also separated. We implement a proto-
type by using disk management as an example. The performance shows acceptable
overheads in MyCloud SEP.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, I have presented two types of approaches to protect users’ privacy
in cloud. The migration based approach is compatible with current existing cloud and
protect user’ privacy with the help of cloud providers. According to my evaluation,
the migration based approach can improve the security of guest VMs. The cloud
providers do not need to update their hypervisor and the management tools do not
need to be revised in order to use special HyperCall to communicate with hypervisor.
However, the migration based approach cannot protect users’ privacy from inside
attacks, such as the malicious cloud administrator, vulnerable management tool and
illegal device drivers. The hardware-based approach (MyCloud and MyCloud SEP)
proposes a redesigned cloud hypervisor to eliminate the privileges of cloud providers
and isolate users’ privacy from device and control VM. Any unapproved access to
users’ privacy will be trapped and prohibited by the hypervisor. Based on the ex-
periment on our prototype, this approach can provide cloud users a secure execution
environment. Cloud users only need to trust the verifiable hypervisor and the hard-
ware resources (e.g. CPU, motherboard). Although the cloud providers need to
replace their hypervisor with MyCloud or MyCloud SEP, the performance overhead
is acceptable. In MyCloud SEP, we even move the disk management to the non-root
mode. Therefore, the hypervisor not only monitors the memory resources but also,
prohibits any malicious disk access. Cloud users do not need to manage the device
drivers by themselves, instead cloud platform can assign them a virtualized device.
The approach in this dissertation has laid a solid foundation towards trustworthy
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virtualization systems. It creates various opportunities for future work. In the follow-
ing, I propose a new direction to protect users’ privacy on an untrusted hypervisor.
In the future, the hardware mentor will offer more and more security features on CPU
and motherboard. CPU will automatically encrypt and decrypt the instructions and
users’ data. Then, the guest VMs can be executed by an untrusted cloud hypervisor.
In current stage, we just implement a prototype with simple scheduler. In the future,
we will upgrade the scheduler and support more VMs in MyCloud and MyCloud SEP.
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Appendix A
ABBREVIATIONS
Vt-x Intel CPU Virtualization Technology
Vt-d Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O
EPT Extended Page Table
VM Virtual Machine
GPA Guest Physical Address
HPA Host Physical Address
GVA Guest Virtual Address
DVA Device Virtual Address
MMU Memory Management Unit
IOMMU IO Memory Management Unit
VMM Virtual Machine Manager
ACM Access Control Matrix
RAR Resource Allocation Recorder
IaaS Infrastructure as a service
PaaS Platform as a service
SaaS Software as a service
Dom 0 Domain 0
OS Operating System
TCB Trust Computing Base
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VMX Intel Virtualization Technology
VMCS Virtual Machine Control Structure
DMA Direct Memory Access
DTMC District Time
NVD National Vulnerability Database
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System
ADG Attack Dependency Graph
SMM System Management Mode
SMRR System Range Register
TXT Trusted Execution Technology
LOC Lines of Codes
VPID Virtual Processor ID
SMP Symmetric Multiprocessing Processors
DoS Denial of Service
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VDM Virtual Disk Manager
SATA Serial ATA
AHCI Advanced Host Controller Interface
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
CET Context-Entry Table
MSR Model-Specific Register
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KVM Kernel-based Virtual Machine Module
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